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Abstract
We consider price-fee competition in bilateral oligopolies with perfectly-divisible goods,
non-expandable infrastructures, concentrated agents on both sides, and constant mar-
ginal costs. We define and characterize stable market outcomes. Buyers exclusively
trade with the supplier with whom they achieve maximal bilateral joint welfare. Prices
equal marginal costs. Threats to switch suppliers set maximal fees. These also arise
from a negotiation model that extends price competition. Competition in both prices
and fees necessarily emerges. It improves welfare compared to price competition, but
consumer surpluses do not increase. The minimal infrastructure achieving maximal
aggregate welfare differs from the one that protects buyers most.
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1 Introduction
Oligopolistic competition often requires some infrastructure with costly transportation. This
can vary from costs of postal services when purchasing books or computers from online shops
to physical infrastructure required to transport perfectly-divisible goods such as water, chem-
icals, electricity and natural gas. Often, in such contexts, payments for goods consist of two
parts: a price per unit and a fee, i.e. a fixed monetary amount. Transportation costs
may differ per supplier and per customer, for example tariffs for postal services typically
distinguish between domestic and foreign destinations. Also, product modifications in the
intermediate goods market to meet specifications set by heterogeneous customers can be
treated as relation-specific transport cost. The importance of heterogeneous transportation
costs in trade is not at par with standard microeconomics, with the notable exceptions
of Hotelling (1929), Salop (1979), or Economides (1986) for markets with infinitely-many
small customers and indivisible goods. Also, oligopolistic competition in both prices and
fees receives limited attention. Oi (1971), Schmalensee (1981) and Schmalensee (1982) ana-
lyze two-part pricing for monopoly markets where the supplier lacks information about the
consumers’ willingness to pay for a perfectly-divisible good. Two-part pricing in oligopoly
settings with perfect information is studied in e.g. Calem and Spulber (1984), Harrison and
Kline (2001), or Kanemoto (2000). In our study, we analyze competition in both prices
and fees in an oligopolistic market with a finite number of concentrated buyers and suppli-
ers, all heterogeneous, on a given non-expandable infrastructure that is needed to transport
some perfectly-divisible good. Marginal costs of both production and transportation are
constant and relation-specific. One aim of this study is to analyze oligopolistic competition
in prices and fees, the quantities traded and how these are affected by the non-expandable
infrastructure.
Markets with a few concentrated suppliers and a few concentrated buyers, who all can
exercise market power, are referred to as bilateral oligopolies. It is well known that con-
centration on the supply side increases market power and that it has negative consequences
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for consumer welfare and aggregate social welfare, see e.g. Tirole (1988) or Motta (2004).
Conditions under which these results extend to bilateral oligopolies are derived in e.g. Bloch
and Ghosal (1997), Bloch and Ferrer (2001), or Amir and Bloch (2009). Galbraith (1952) is
probably the first author who has argued that concentrated buyers can also have counter-
vailing power that can restrain the market power of suppliers. Hence, especially in bilateral
oligopolies with high concentration on both sides, the relationship between concentration,
market power and efficiency is much more complex, and only a few studies have investigated
this relationship both theoretically and empirically. Of those studies, several have tested
the countervailing power hypothesis, and there appears to be evidence that buyer concen-
tration negatively affects the market power of suppliers, see e.g. Scherer and Ross (1990)
for a review of this literature that was initiated by Lustgarten (1975). Also, Schumacher
(1991) supports the countervailing power hypothesis in a study based on US manufacturing
industries. All studies emphasize that threats to switch orders from one supplier to another
strengthen a buyer’s bargaining position.1 A second aim of this study is to investigate the
relationship between market concentration on both sides, market power and efficiency in
bilateral oligopolies. We also characterize the minimal infrastructure that achieves maximal
aggregate social welfare and the one that protects buyers most from the supply side’s market
power.
As an appropriate equilibrium concept for bilateral oligopolies we propose a stability
concept that balances, on the one hand, generality without too much specific institutional
details to capture a variety of bargaining processes.2 On the other hand, this equilibrium
concept takes into account the essence of market power or bargaining power of suppliers and
buyers, including threats to switch orders from one supplier to another. As the equilibrium
concept, we impose stability against deviating coalitions of traders: prices, fees and traded
1Another threat by which buyers can strengthen their bargaining position is to start upstream production
themselves. Inderst and Wey (2007) and Dana (2012) investigate the threat of forming buyer groups that
will act on behalf of their members, which requires some form of either legal or credible commitment. In our
study we only look at the threat of switching orders.
2For that reason, we do not impose explicit price setting mechanisms such as in e.g. the market game
proposed in Shapley and Shubik (1977).
2
quantities are in equilibrium if there are no alternative prices, fees and quantities such that
either no buyer wants to join another supplier’s clientele, or no supplier wants to reduce or
expand his clientele. Stability is defined on the non-expandable infrastructure.
We characterize all stable market outcomes and show that these have a lattice structure
and are bilaterally efficient. Bilateral efficiency means that positive quantities in each pair-
wise trade maximize the bilateral joint welfare of this pair, which consists of the standard
consumer and producer surplus, taking all other trades as given. Therefore, bilateral effi-
ciency implies relation-specific marginal-cost pricing in order to realize the maximal bilateral
joint welfare. This result implies that all stable market outcomes are also Pareto efficient:
the equilibrium quantities are the same as if all firms were price-takers. Thus, market power
under oligopolistic competition in prices and fees does not necessarily cause distortions as
opposed to oligopolistic competition in prices, where deadweight losses are unavoidable. This
result is similar to those reported in e.g. Oi (1971), but different from the results in e.g.
Calem and Spulber (1984), or Harrison and Kline (2001).
The relation-specific fee distributes the joint welfare between the buyer and supplier,
where higher fees can be seen as a reflection of higher supply side market power. From
the perspective of buyers, zero fees yield maximal consumer surplus. In any stable market
outcome, suppliers may trade with several buyers. Each buyer, however, exclusively trades
with his most-efficient supplier, i.e., the one with the lowest cost, on the infrastructure in
order to achieve the maximal bilateral joint welfare, but this makes each buyer vulnerable
to market power exercised by his most-efficient supplier. Such market power, however, is
limited by each buyer’s threat to trade with his second-efficient supplier on the infrastructure.
Therefore, a buyer’s maximal fee is bounded from above by the difference of the maximal
bilateral joint welfare levels that can be achieved by trading with his most-efficient supplier
and second-efficient supplier. The set of stable fees has a lattice structure. All these results
can be linked to similar results for assignment games in matching markets with indivisible
goods, see Shapley and Shubik (1972), Roth and Sotomayor (1990), Camina (2006), and
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Sozanski (2006).
The stability concept induces unique relation-specific prices and unique relation-specific
positive quantities traded, but the non-degenerate ranges of relation-specific fees reveal inde-
terminacy. We do not regard indeterminacy as a critique, because it allows for flexibility in
filling in the precise institutional details of the market and the distribution of bargaining or
market power. In the bargaining literature, there are many bargaining protocols that each
induce different market outcomes. In our study, we modify the one-sided proposal-making
model from the literature on matching markets, see e.g. Roth and Sotomayor (1990), to
model extreme market or bargaining power by one side of the market. The modified negoti-
ation model features simultaneous price-fee proposals by agents from one side of the market
to all connected agents on the opposite side of the market and, if accepted, the agents who
accept choose quantities. We are especially interested in the supply side making such propos-
als and compare the outcomes to those arising from oligopolistic (differentiated Bertrand)
price competition. Suppliers propose marginal-cost pricing and the maximal stable fees, all
relation-specific. Buyers accept the offer from their most-efficient supplier and demand the
joint-welfare maximizing quantities. Compared to oligopolistic price competition, competi-
tion in both prices and fees improves aggregate joint welfare but buyers are not better off.
Finally, when buyers propose, then we have the relation-specific marginal-cost pricing and
no (or zero) fees result. The latter can be seen as the outcome under perfect competition.
Because each buyer only utilizes a single link among his potential trading relations on
the non-expandable infrastructure, we also identify the minimal infrastructure that would
generate maximal aggregate joint welfare among all infrastructures and this only requires
that each buyer is linked to his most-efficient supplier among all suppliers. To reduce vulner-
ability of buyers to market power exercised by the supply side, we also identify the minimal
infrastructure that would generate the maximal aggregate consumer surplus among all in-
frastructures and this requires that each buyer is linked to his most-efficient supplier and his
second-most efficient supplier among all suppliers. In such setting, even though each buyer
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will never utilize one of his two links, the other link needs to be present in order to have a
credible threat of switching to another supplier.
The current study introduces the framework of bilateral oligopolies and explains the main
ideas of competition in relation-specific prices and fees on a non-expandable infrastructure.
This allows us to offer three major insights: a theory of market competition and market
power in concentrated markets with a non-expandable infrastructure; identification of the
non-expandable infrastructure with maximal buyer protection; and emergence of competition
in prices and fees instead of oligopolistic competition in prices only. We regard a thorough
understanding of non-expandable infrastructures as a first and necessary step towards an
analysis of market power on expandable infrastructures under costly investment. Such analy-
sis will be provided in a companion paper Funaki et al. (2012). Expandable infrastructures
are more appropriate in the setting with less costly investment such as contractual rela-
tionships, software development for heterogeneous clients, or relation-specific investments in
intermediate goods markets to meet heterogeneous buyers’ specifications, as discussed in e.g.
Bjornerstedt and Stenneck (2007). Nevertheless, the results for non-expandable infrastruc-
tures are relevant to analyze spot-markets on infrastructures that cannot be expanded in
the short run, such as infrastructure for natural gas and oil, and relation-specific capital
investments.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model and in section 3 three
motivating examples are provided. Oligopolistic competition in prices and fees on a non-
expandable infrastructure is analyzed in Section 4. Some concluding remarks are left for
Section 5.
2 The model
Consider a market with a finite set S of suppliers, |S| ≥ 1, of some good and a finite set B
of buyers, |B| ≥ 1. We denote an individual supplier as i and an individual buyer as j. The
set of all agents is N = S ∪ B. Each agent in N is either a supplier or a buyer, that is the
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sets S and B are disjoint, i.e. S ∩B = ∅.
Bilateral trade requires infrastructure that links supplier i and buyer j. Without such
a link, a pair of buyers and suppliers cannot trade. The link between supplier i and buyer
j is denoted ij ≡ (i, j) ∈ S × B, and often we call ij a pair. The set of all potential links
ij is denoted by gN = {ij|ij ∈ S ×B}, which is an undirected graph. An infrastructure g
on N is an arbitrary set of links g ⊆ gN . In particular, the set of all feasible links gN is
called the complete infrastructure and g0 = ∅ represents the absence of any infrastructure.
The collection of all networks is denoted by GN = {g|g ⊆ gN}. In what follows, we think of
infrastructures as some non-expandable infrastructure inherited from the past whose building
costs are sunk. For explanatory reasons, we assume that links are of unlimited capacity. Its
operating and managing costs are assumed to be included in the variable transportation
costs, which are defined below.
In this market, we keep track of trade flows between pairs of linked suppliers and buyers.
For a given infrastructure g ⊆ gN and a pair ij ∈ g, the quantity qij ≥ 0 denotes the
flow of output from supplier i to buyer j. For convenience, we set qij = 0 to represent
the infeasibility of trade for any pair ij /∈ g, and we denote the matrix of all trades on
g ⊆ gN as Q|g = (qij)ij∈S×B ∈ R|S×B|+ . Supplier i’s total production or quantity sold is
qi =
∑
j∈B:ij∈g qij. Production and shipping products within any pair takes place against
constant marginal costs that depend upon the identity of the suppliers and buyers. Denote
cij ≥ 0, ij ∈ gN , as the marginal costs of both production and transportation from supplier
i to buyer j. Suppliers may sell their products to multiple buyers. Given trades Q|g on
infrastructure g ⊆ gN , we define the endogenous trade network T (Q|g) ∈ g as all links
ij ∈ g with qij > 0, i.e. all links with positive trade. Supplier i’s active customer network
consists of those buyers with whom this supplier trades positive amounts (and with whom
he is linked to).3 More specific, for supplier i, Ti (Q|g) ⊆ B denotes supplier i’s set of active
buyers j for which qij > 0 on infrastructure g. By definition, this set may be empty if
3The passive or inactive customer network consists of those buyers that are linked to the supplier, and
that do not purchase the product.
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supplier i has no customers, a singleton in case he has only one customer or it contains
multiple elements in case this supplier has many customers.
Given tradesQ|g on infrastructure g ⊆ gN , buyer j’s total consumption is qj =
∑
i∈S:ij∈g qij,
and this buyer has the quasi-linear utility function uj (qj) +mj, where the function uj is in-
creasing in qj and mj is monetary wealth. We consider markets for which the standard
demand as a function of the market price satisfies the Law of Demand, i.e. the demand is
decreasing in its own price e.g. Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995). This law holds
whenever the utility function is strictly quasi-concave and, by Crouzeix and Lindberg (1986),
this is equivalent to strict concavity of the function uj. For buyer j, Tj (Q|g) ⊆ S denotes
buyer j’s set of active suppliers i for which qij > 0 on infrastructure g.
Competition in this market takes place through relation-specific prices pij ≥ cij and
relation-specific fees fij ≥ 0 for all pairs ij ∈ g. Joint pair-wise welfare within the pair ij ∈ g
can be expressed as the sum of i’s producer surplus (pij − cij) qij+fij and j’s consumer surplus
uj(qij)− pijqij − fij. The maximal joint welfare for the pair ij is given by maxqij≥0 uj(qij)−
cijqij. For technical convenience, we assume a unique joint welfare maximum for each possible
link, that each buyer can rank such welfare maxima over the suppliers in S and we impose
differentiability.
Assumption 1 All cij ≥ 0, ij ∈ gN , are mutually different, and for each buyer j ∈ S, the
function uj is increasing, continuously differentiable and strictly concave in qj, uj (0) = 0,
and u′j (0) > maxi∈S cij.
Recall that the Law of Demand imposes strict concavity, or u′j decreasing, and combined
with continuous differentiability of the utility functions implies that u′j (qij) = cij has at most
one solution. Our assumption on the slope of uj at qj = 0 ensures that, in case of exclusive
trade in the pair ij, a solution exists in which buyer j consumes a positive quantity qij and
that the maximal joint welfare without building costs is positive for each pair ij ∈ gN .
For the initial non-expandable infrastructure g ⊆ gN , the maximal joint welfare associated
with exclusive trade by buyer j with supplier i on the link ij ∈ gN , denoted wg (ij), is defined
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as
wg (ij) =
{
maxqij≥0 [uj(qij)− cijqij] , if ij ∈ g,
0, if ij /∈ g. (1)
For technical convenience, we assume that each buyer and each supplier has an incentive to
trade on at least one link (otherwise we could remove such agent from the model). Addi-
tionally, for all g ⊆ gN , all positive values for wg (ij) are mutually different.
Assumption 2 Each buyer j ∈ B has at least one link i′j ∈ gN such that wg (i′j) > 0, each
supplier i ∈ S has at least one link ij′ ∈ gN such that wg (ij′) > 0, and all positive wg (ij),
ij ∈ gN , are mutually different.
Finally, we denote the matrices of all prices and fees on g ⊆ gN as P |g = (pij)ij∈S×B ∈
R|S×B|+ , respectively, F |g = (fij)ij∈S×B ∈ R|S×B|. The latter means we allow that links might
be subsidized. We set pij = u
′
j (0) > cij and fij = 0 to represent the infeasibility of trade for
any pair ij /∈ g, which makes qij = 0 the optimal trade in ij /∈ g with supplier i’s producer
surplus equal to zero.
3 Motivating examples
In this section, we discuss competition in both prices and fees in order to stress that it is a
natural extension of the standard oligopolistic competition in prices only.
To set ideas, we first consider the smallest market possible on a non-expandable in-
frastructure, namely the market that consists of a single supplier that is linked to a single
buyer, referred to as supplier 1 and buyer 1 (see the left-hand side of Figure 1). Quantity
q11 will be traded against price p11 and fee f11. Additionally, we suppose that the constant
marginal costs of production and transportation are c11 = 1, and buyer 1 has the quasi-linear
utility function 10
√
q11− p11q11− f11. The maximal joint welfare in this market, which con-
sists of the sum of the producer and consumer surplus, is twenty-five and it can be reached
by setting the price p11 equal to marginal costs and trading q11 equal to twenty-five units.
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Figure 1: Supplier 1 is the single supplier in Case I, and one of two suppliers in Case II.
Such price implies that the producer surplus equals the fee f11, and the consumer surplus is
25− f11. The fee therefore determines how the joint maximal welfare is divided within each
pair.
Given that both the supplier and the buyer can act strategically in this market, nego-
tiations will result in marginal-cost pricing p11 = 1 and a fee f11 ∈ [0, 25]. In case of a
monopoly, the theory in Oi (1971) predicts that the supplier will extract the entire consumer
surplus by setting the price p11 = 1 and fee f11 = 25. Hence, the monopoly outcome is Pareto
efficient, but also very unfavorable for the consumer. This result differs from the standard
monopoly where a price above marginal costs is set to extract consumer surplus and fees are
absent. Standard monopoly pricing is Pareto inefficient, but at least the consumer surplus is
positive. The monopoly outcome in Oi (1971) can also be seen as the equilibrium outcome
of a price-fee-setting game in which the supplier sets a price and fee before the buyer decides
how much to buy. By reversing roles in a monopsony, the buyer will set the price p11 = 1
and fee f11 = 0 and it can be supported as the equilibrium outcome of a price-fee-setting
game.
To further illustrate our ideas, we expand the previous situation by introducing a second
supplier who is less efficient, called supplier 2, who has constant marginal costs of production
and transportation c21 = 2. Supplier 2’s price and fee are p21 and f21. The maximal joint
welfare supplier 2 and buyer 1 can attain when linked, which again consists of the sum
of the producer and consumer surplus, is twelve-and-a-half. It can be reached by setting
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the price p21 equal to supplier 2’s marginal costs and trading q21 equal to six-and-a-quarter
units. Such price implies that supplier 2’s producer surplus equals his fee f21, and the
consumer surplus is 12.5 − f21. Again, the fee redistributes the joint maximal welfare. For
a non-expandable infrastructure, Figure 1 illustrates two possible cases. In case the non-
expandable infrastructure only links supplier 1 and buyer 1, i.e. Case I, the results for the
monopoly case still apply.
We therefore consider the case with both suppliers connected to the buyer, which is Case
II of Figure 1. Given that both suppliers and the buyer can act strategically in this market,
supplier 1 must take into account the presence of supplier 2 in negotiations on prices and
fees.4 Since supplier 2 and buyer 1 can reach a joint welfare of twelve-and-a-half together,
supplier 1 cannot extract more welfare from buyer 1 than twenty-five minus twelve-and-a-half,
which is also twelve-and-a-half. So, negotiations will result in supplier 1’s price p11 = c11
and fee f11 ∈ [0, 12.5], and supplier 2’s price p21 = c21 and fee f21 = 0. The theory in
Oi (1971) can be easily extended to competition in prices and fees in this duopoly, if one
considers the following price-fee-setting game: Simultaneously and independently suppliers
set their price and fee combination, and then the buyer decides how much to demand from
each supplier. Then, the unique equilibrium outcome supports the above prices and fees
with f11 = 12.5, and the buyer purchases twenty-five units from supplier 1 and nothing from
supplier 2.5 Hence, this equilibrium outcome is Pareto efficient and more favorable for the
buyer than the modified price-fee-setting game in the monopoly situation. This result differs
from the standard duopoly where supplier 1 sets his price equal to supplier 2’s marginal costs
to extract consumer surplus and fees are absent.6 This standard duopoly outcome is Pareto
inefficient, supplier 1’s producer surplus is six-and-a-quarter, and for this specific numerical
example the buyer is equally well off as under competition in prices and fees. Obviously,
4By negotiations, we envision some unmodeled negotiation process that will result in a Core solution. In
this case, the two producer surpluses and the consumer surplus sum to twenty-five and the sum of supplier
2’s producer surplus and buyer 1’s consumer surplus is at least twelve-and-a-half.
5Since the buyer decides where to buy, existence of an equilibrium follows from Simon and Zame (1990).
6This equilibrium exists for reasons similar as in the previous footnote.
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supplier 1 strictly prefers to set a price and fee instead of only a price without a fee. By doing
so, supplier 1 extracts both the consumer surplus and the deadweight loss associated with
standard duopoly pricing. So, the price-fee-setting game on a non-expandable infrastructure
also explains the phenomenon of setting two-part tariffs in practice. By reversing the roles
in a monopsony, the buyer will set p11 = p21 = c11 and f11 = f21 = 0, and supplier 1 will
exclusively trade twenty-five units with buyer 1. Note that adding a third supplier, called
supplier 3, with marginal costs above 2 will not change the above market outcomes. From
here on, we consider three suppliers in our example.
The example makes one point clear: From buyer 1’s perspective, the presence of the link
between supplier 2 is a safeguard against supplier 1’s market power, yet this link will never
be utilized for trade. The link with the third-efficient supplier 3 is not needed. This is a
fundamental tension between the minimal infrastructure that maximizes social welfare from
trade and the minimal infrastructure that minimizes the supply side’s market power. In
this paper, we develop a theory that characterizes both such minimal infrastructures and we
show that the former is included in the latter.
4 Competition on non-expandable infrastructures
In this section, we analyze oligopolistic competition in prices and fees on a non-expandable
infrastructure. As the equilibrium concept, we modify the concept of a deviating (or block-
ing) coalition to the context of a perfectly divisible good and money on an infrastructure.
We characterize the set of stable market outcomes and show that this set has a lattice struc-
ture. Then, we analyze strategic negotiation models that yield each side’s most preferred
stable market outcome as the unique equilibrium outcome. All these issues are treated in
separate subsections, and the last one contains two important examples. In essence, this
section extends well-known properties of two-sided markets with matching, as surveyed in
e.g. Roth and Sotomayor (1990), to oligopolistic markets with a divisible good and money
on an initial non-expandable infrastructure.
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4.1 Competition in prices and fees
In this subsection, we introduce the notion of stability of market outcomes to analyze com-
petition in prices and fees. This notion will be applied in characterizing the set of stable
market outcomes in the next subsection.
Economic models of markets are conceived from the fundamental idea that competition
between suppliers and buyers is voluntary and trading is decentralized. Bilateral trade within
a pair of suppliers and buyers is voluntary only if such trade is at least as good as no trade,
because otherwise some agent would be forced to trade against the prevailing conditions.
Bilateral trade is not conducted by a pair of suppliers and buyers in isolation, but takes
place in a market with a possibility to trade with other suppliers and buyers. The presence
of other agents implies outside options for each pair, which presumably affect the conditions
of trade within each pair. For the marriage market and markets with indivisible goods and
money, pair-wise stability would be the appropriate concept, see e.g. Roth and Sotomayor
(1990). In our market, however, the good is perfectly divisible, suppliers may trade with
several buyers, and buyers may trade with several suppliers. Since we also assume that
suppliers and buyers negotiate prices and fees, the Core concept seems more appropriate to
define stability of market outcomes.
Market outcomes consist of prices, fees, and the quantities traded. A market outcome on
a non-expandable infrastructure g ⊆ gN is defined as the triple (P |g, F |g,Q|g). Therefore,
each market outcome generates an endogenous trade network T (Q|g) ∈ g of positive trades.
Recall that supplier i’s active customer network is given by Ti (Q|g) ⊆ B. Similar, buyer
i’s active supplier network is denoted as Tj (Q|g) ⊆ S. The Core concept imposes that any
market outcome on a non-expandable infrastructure is stable if no coalition of suppliers and
buyers wants to break away and trade on their own. To put it differently, all coalitions of
suppliers and buyers weakly prefer the market outcome to trading as a subgroup.
Formally, for coalition C ⊆ N on infrastructure g ⊆ gN , we define the buyer’s quantity
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purchased from suppliers in coalition C as
qj (C|g) =
∑
i∈Tj(Q|g)∩C
qij.
For C = N , we write qj (N |g). Any stable market outcome (P ∗|g, F ∗|g,Q∗|g) yields each
agent a surplus. For supplier i ∈ S, the surplus consists of the revenues and fees collected
from his active customer network Ti (Q
∗|g):
∑
j∈Ti(Q∗|g)
[
(p∗ij − cij)q∗ij + f ∗ij
]
.
For buyer j ∈ B, the consumer surplus consists of the difference between his utility from
purchasing q∗j (N |g) from his active supplier network Tj (Q|g) and the expenditures and fees
paid to his active suppliers:
uj
(
q∗j (N |g)
)− ∑
i∈Tj(Q∗|g)
[
p∗ijq
∗
ij + f
∗
ij
]
.
Any market outcome yields each coalition in total a welfare that is equal to the sum of its
members’ surpluses. Let C = CS∪CB be the partition of coalition C ⊆ N into suppliers and
buyers. The market outcome (P ∗|g, F ∗|g,Q∗|g) yields coalition C on infrastructure g ⊆ gN
the joint welfare:
∑
i∈CS

 ∑
j∈Ti(Q∗|g)
[
(p∗ij − cij)q∗ij + f ∗ij
]+ ∑
j∈CB

uj (q∗j (N |g))− ∑
i∈Tj(Q∗|g)
[
pijq
∗
ij + f
∗
ij
] . (2)
This is coalition C’s joint welfare in case it stays and trades according to market outcome
(P ∗|g, F ∗|g,Q∗|g). Next, suppose coalition C considers to deviate from the above market out-
come through the alternative market outcome (P |g, F |g,Q|g). The surplus for any supplier
in coalition C consists of the revenues and fees collected from his active customer network
restricted to the buyers in coalition C, i.e. for supplier i ∈ CS these are all j ∈ Ti (Q|g)∩CB.
Similarly, the consumer surplus of buyer j ∈ CB consists of the difference between his utility
from purchasing qj (C|g) from his active suppliers in C, i.e. all i ∈ Tj (Q|g) ∩ CS, and the
revenues and fees paid to these active suppliers in C. Since market outcome (P |g, F |g,Q|g)
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yields each coalition a joint welfare that is equal to the sum of its members’ surpluses,
deviating coalition C’s joint welfare is given by:
∑
i∈CS

 ∑
j∈Ti(Q|g)∩CB
[(pij − cij)qij + fij]

+∑
j∈CB

uj (qj (C|g))− ∑
i∈Tj(Q|g)∩CS
[pijqij + fij]

 . (3)
The main difference between (2) and (3) is that if a coalition stays it will trade internally in C
and externally of its coalition inN , and if it deviates as a deviating coalition it will only trade
internally. In essence, by deviating coalition C disrupts several external trades. Deviating
is profitable only if such disruptions can be compensated by the surpluses from internal
trades within the coalition. The market outcome is stable if every conceivable deviation is
unprofitable. Given the joint welfare of deviating and non-deviating coalitions, we are ready
to define stability of market outcomes.
Definition 3 Market outcome (P ∗|g, F ∗|g,Q∗|g) on a non-expandable infrastructure g ⊆ gN
is stable if the following condition holds:
For all coalitions C ⊆ N and all (P |g, F |g,Q|g) : (2) ≥ (3) . (4)
Condition (4) expresses the idea that deviating coalitions are unprofitable, and it is a re-
formulation of Core stability for cooperative games in characteristic function form. Although
our setup refrains from explicit market mechanisms and is therefore not a non-cooperative
market game, our stability notion resembles some ideas underlying coalition-proof equilibria,
as proposed in Bernheim et al. (1987) and Bernheim and Whinston (1987). Dana (2012)
characterizes such equilibria in his study of the formation of buyer groups in the presence
of Bertrand price competition. In Section 4.3, we also consider such price competition but
without an ex-ante stage where buyers merge into groups. Several important observations
can be made. For singleton coalitions, each individual agent is weakly better of by trading
than voluntary refraining from such trade. In any stable market outcome, each pair ij ∈ g
can at least achieve its bilateral maximal joint welfare wg (ij) from exclusive bilateral trade
within their pair. For C = N , (4) imposes Pareto efficiency on the market outcome.
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4.2 Characterization of stable market outcomes
In this subsection, we provide a full characterization of stable market outcomes on a non-
expandable infrastructure. Furthermore, we establish that the set of stable market outcomes
has a lattice structure.
The characterization of stable market outcomes requires the definition of a buyer’s most-
efficient and second-(most-)efficient supplier on the infrastructure, which will be defined in
terms of the maximal joint welfare within pairs of suppliers and buyers. For g ⊆ gN , we
define buyer j’s most-efficient supplier αj (g) ∈ S on the infrastructure g as the supplier on
g with whom j can attain his largest maximal joint welfare:
wg (αj (g) j) ≥ wg (ij) , for all i ∈ S : ij ∈ g. (5)
Since maximal joint welfare is related to the most-efficient supplier in terms of marginal
costs, we might alternatively define αj (g) as the supplier for whom cαj(g)j = mini∈S:ij∈g cij,
but (5) captures the key insight needed in Section 5. Buyer j’s most-efficient supplier αj (g)
is uniquely defined if buyer j is linked through g to one or more suppliers in S. Otherwise,
we impose the convention that αj (g) = 0 denotes supplier "nobody" who has marginal
cost c0j = u
′
j (0), which makes q0j = 0 optimal, and the pair 0j has maximal joint welfare
wg (0j) = 0. By definition, either cαj(g)j = mini∈S:ij∈g cij or c0j. A buyer’s second-efficient
supplier is defined similarly. For g ⊆ gN , buyer j’s second-efficient supplier i ∈ S on the
infrastructure g is the supplier βj (g) on g with whom j can attain his second maximal joint
welfare:
wg
(
βj (g) j
) ≥ wg (ij) , for all i ∈ S\ {αj (g)} : ij ∈ g. (6)
Buyer j’s second-efficient supplier βj (g) is uniquely defined if buyer j is linked through g to
two or more suppliers in S. Otherwise, and similar as before, we impose the convention that
βj (g) = 0, marginal cost c0j = u
′
j (0), and the pair 0j has maximal joint welfare wg (0j) = 0.
By definition, either cβj(g)j = mini∈S\{αj(g)}:ij∈g cij or c0j.
We have the following characterization. All proofs are deferred to the appendix.
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Proposition 4 Market outcome (P ∗|g, F ∗|g,Q∗|g) on a non-expandable infrastructure g ⊆
gN is stable if and only if for all ij ∈ g :
p∗αj(g)j = cαj(g)j, p
∗
ij ≥ cij, if i 6= αj (g) ,
f ∗αj(g)j ∈
[
0, wg(αj (g) j)− wg(βj (g) j)
]
, f ∗ij ≥ 0, if i 6= αj (g) ,
q∗αj(g)j = argmaxqαj(g)j≥0 uj(qαj(g)j)− cαj(g)jqαj(g)j, q∗ij = 0, if i 6= αj (g) .
(7)
For i ∈ S and j ∈ B, supplier i’s active customers network Ti (Q∗|g) = {j ∈ B|i = αj (g)},
and buyer j’s active supplier network Tj (Q
∗|g) = {αj (g)}.
From the proof it follows that multiple prices and fees can occur in stable market outcomes
on any link ij ∈ g that will not be utilized for trade. Suppliers on those links know that even
at their lowest acceptable prices and fees, which are p∗ij = cij and f
∗
ij = 0, their products
are too expensive from the perspective of buyer j. Therefore, their prices and fees do not
matter.
Proposition 4 implies a very precise prediction of stable market outcomes. Each buyer
exclusively trades with his most-efficient supplier on the infrastructure against a price that
equals this supplier’s marginal costs and pays a positive fee. This makes buyer j vulnerable
to market power exercised by his most-efficient supplier. Such market power is limited by the
buyer’s threat to trade with his second-efficient supplier βj (g) ∈ S ∪ {0} on infrastructure
g. Since supplier βj (g)’s current profit from zero trades with buyer j is zero, buyer j can
seduce supplier βj (g) to trade and by doing so guarantee himself a consumer surplus of
wg(βj (g) j). This limits the market power of the most-efficient supplier αj (g) in extracting
consumer surplus from the pair αj (g) j ∈ g, because supplier αj (g) must make sure that
buyer j enjoys at least a consumer surplus of wg(βj (g) j) through the link βj (g) j. The most-
efficient supplier’s fee is therefore bounded from above by the difference between wg(αj (g) j)
and wg(βj (g) j).
Under marginal cost of production and transportation, a supplier’s producer surplus is
equal to the sum of profits per individual link. Supplier i’s profit that can be attributed
to the link ij ∈ g for buyer j ∈ Ti (Q∗|g) is equal to (p∗ij − cij)q∗ij + f ∗ij = f ∗ij ≥ 0, with
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strict inequality if Ti (Q
∗|g) 6= ∅ and equality otherwise. Supplier i’s aggregate profit is
equal to the sum of these fees, i.e.
∑
j∈Ti(Q∗|g)
f ∗ij, and only supplier’s who are some buyer’s
most-efficient supplier make positive profits. Then, it is impossible that trade in a link is
subsidized, because f ∗ij < 0 would be an incentive for supplier i to refuse trade on such a
link. Supplier i’s active customer network consists of all buyers for whom this supplier is the
most-efficient supplier.
We investigate the upper bound on the most-efficient supplier’s fee for several special
cases. In case j is only linked to a single supplier, then βj (g) = 0 and wg(0j) = 0 im-
ply f ∗αj(g)j ≤ wg(αj (g) j). The absence of a second-efficient supplier imposes no threat to
supplier αj (g) and hence no limitation to this supplier’s market power. In case j is linked
to two or more suppliers, the difference in marginal costs between the most-efficient sup-
plier and the second-efficient supplier matter. If this difference is relatively large, than
wg(βj (g) j) will be relatively small compared to wg(αj (g) j), and the limiting effect of the
threat to switch suppliers will be relatively small. On the other hand, if both the marginal
costs of the most-efficient supplier and the second-efficient supplier are relatively close to
each other, then wg(βj (g) j) will be relatively close to wg(αj (g) j) and the presence of the
second-efficient supplier has a substantial dampening effect on the most-efficient supplier’s
fee. In case these marginal costs would coincide, which we exclude for convenience, then
wg(βj (g) j) = wg(αj (g) j) and the most-efficient supplier’s fee must be zero. This implies a
testable hypothesis for industries with almost identical costs structures the equilibrium fees
will be small.
The lower bound on all most-efficient suppliers’ fees also has an interesting interpretation.
In that case the fee f ∗ij = 0 for all ij ∈ g. It can be interpreted as the generalization of the
competitive equilibrium for markets on a non-expandable infrastructure in the sense that all
suppliers follow marginal-cost pricing at zero fees. In this equilibrium, the entire maximal
joint welfare from trade accrues to the buyers, while the suppliers have zero profits. Given
different constant marginal costs, the competitive equilibrium implies relation-specific prices,
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and zero profits for all suppliers, whether active or not. Obviously, relation-specific prices
are Pareto efficient and a uniform price per supplier would not.
For some particular market structures, we can be more specific. In case of a monopoly,
i.e. S = {1}, the monopolist’s active customer network is T1 (Q∗|g) = {j ∈ B|1j ∈ g}. By
Assumption 1, each connected buyer has the monopolist as his most-efficient supplier and
prefers to trade with the monopolist. Since there is no second-efficient supplier, the range
of fees is maximal. This means that the only countervailing power for buyers depends upon
their negotiation skills. The reverse situation occurs in case of a monopsony, i.e. B = {1},
where only the single link α1 (g) 1 will have positive quantities of trade and the fee will
fully depend upon supplier α1 (g) and buyer i’s negotiation skills. In case of a duopoly, i.e.
S = {1, 2}, it depends upon the infrastructure g ⊆ gN whether each connected buyer is
connected to either supplier 1, or supplier 2 or both suppliers. Those who are connected to
both suppliers will be limited in their maximal fees.
For marriage markets and markets for indivisible goods and money, stable market out-
comes can be ordered because the preferences of each side of the market in evaluating stable
market outcomes are opposed, see e.g. the survey Roth and Sotomayor (1990). In our case
this also holds true: The supply side prefers high fees among the set of stable market out-
comes and the demand side prefers low fees from this set. Since the maximal joint welfare in
the market is constant, an improvement in the profit of any supplier must be at the expense
of the consumer surplus of some of the buyers in this supplier’s active customer network.
Vice versa, an improvement in consumer surplus of some buyer must be at the expense of the
profit of his most-efficient supplier. Since we can arbitrarily set the fee in each pair (αj (g) j)
to any f ∗αj(g)j ∈
[
0, wg(αj (g) j)− wg(βj (g) j)
]
independent of how we set fees in other pairs
ij ∈ g, the lattice structure for markets with a perfectly divisible good and money on a
non-expandable infrastructure follows immediately from Proposition 4.
Proposition 5 The set of stable market outcomes of Proposition 4 has a lattice struc-
ture. The supply side’s most-preferred stable market outcome has f ∗αj(g)j = wg(αj (g) j) −
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wg(βj (g) j) for all j ∈ B, and the demand side’s most-preferred stable market outcome has
f ∗αj(g)j = 0 for all i ∈ S.
This result is similar to the results for assignment games in e.g. Roth and Sotomayor (1990).
In fact, an alternative proof of Proposition 5 can be provided that applies cooperative game
theory, and then shows that this game satisfies the conditions that define assignment games.
Since the Core of every assignment game has a lattice structure, this structure immediately
carries over to our model.
Competition in prices and fees allows the following interesting reinterpretation of this
market that also explains the emergence of the lattice structure. Consider a market in which
suppliers and buyers first negotiate a contract that specifies the conditions for trade, which is
unlimited trade against the contract’s specified fixed price. Obviously, contracts that specify
marginal-cost pricing are the most valuable. If we reinterpret the market as a market for the
indivisible good "buyer j has the right to trade with supplier i against price pij", then the
fees f ∗ij represent the standard equilibrium price for markets with indivisible goods such that
each buyer purchases at most one such contract. In such markets, each buyer exclusively
deals with his most-efficient supplier as if he demands at most one unit of the indivisible
good. The insights provide a different intuition why the lattice structure for stable market
outcomes holds.
4.3 Strategic negotiations
For standard assignment games, the lattice structure of the Core allows to implement each
market side’s most preferred outcome as the unique equilibrium outcome of a strategic ne-
gotiation model, see e.g. Roth and Sotomayor (1990). Since we have also derived a lattice
structure, we will also analyze such strategic models in this subsection. In these models, the
agents of one side of the market all propose prices and fees once, the other side accepts or
rejects, and then the buyers decide from whom to purchase how much against the agreed
upon prices and fees. We characterize the unique equilibrium and relate it to the proposing
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side’s most preferred stable market outcomes. In case the supply side proposes, we relate
this equilibrium to the Bertrand equilibrium of standard oligopolistic price competition.
Consider the situation in which the supply side holds all market power. As an important
benchmark model, we first introduce the standard Bertrand price competition. In this model,
each supplier sets possibly relation-specific prices to all the buyers he is connected with.
Then, each buyer decides how much to purchase from each supplier against the prices offered
to him.7 Formally, each supplier i ∈ S proposes prices (pij)j∈B:ij∈g, and then each buyer
j ∈ B chooses his purchases qij ≥ 0. This model is a well defined game in extensive form
for which the subgame perfect equilibrium concept is the appropriate concept, which we call
the Bertrand equilibrium. Dependent upon the infrastructure, buyer j may face none, one
or several suppliers. In case buyer j is connected to a single supplier, then this supplier can
exercise monopoly power on his link with buyer j. To capture this case on a non-expandable
infrastructure g ⊆ gN , we denote buyer j’s set of connected suppliers on g as Sj (g). In case
|Sj (g)| = 1, denote pMαj(g)j as the standard monopoly price that buyer j’s single supplier
would charge. We establish the following equilibrium paths, the supporting strategy profile
can be found in the proof.
Proposition 6 Consider the Bertrand price competition model on a non-expandable in-
frastructure g ⊆ gN . In any Bertrand equilibrium, the suppliers propose
pˆαj(g)j = p
M
αj(g)j
, if |Sj (g)| = 1,
pˆαj(g)j = p
M
αj(g)j
, pˆβj(g)j ≥ cβj(g)j, pˆij ≥ cij otherwise, if |Sj (g)| ≥ 2 and pMαj(g)j < cβj(g)j,
pˆαj(g)j = cβj(g)j, pˆβj(g)j = cβj(g)j, pˆij ≥ cij otherwise, if |Sj (g)| ≥ 2 and pMαj(g)j ≥ cβj(g)j,
and, on the equilibrium path, the buyers purchase
qˆαj(g)j = argmaxqαj(g)j≥0 uj(qαj(g)j)− pˆαj(g)jqαj(g)j, qˆij = 0 otherwise.
7Endogenous buyers’ purchases can be seen as an endogenous tie-breaking rule. As shown in Simon and
Zame (1990), such an endogenous rule guarantees existence of Bertrand equilibria. For similar reasons, all
our negotiation models have endogenous buyers’ purchases.
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This result is a straightforward extension of the standard monopoly model and standard
Bertrand oligopoly with mutually different marginal costs. The multiplicity of Bertrand equi-
libria is nonessential in the sense that the multiple equilibrium prices for the third-efficient
supplier, the fourth-efficient supplier and so on all result in a unique Bertrand equilibrium
outcome: Buyer j ∈ B exclusively trades an amount of qˆαj(g)j with his most-efficient sup-
plier αj (g) ∈ S ∪ {0} against the Bertrand equilibrium price pˆαj(g)j. In a monopoly or in
case the cost advantage of the most-efficient supplier is sufficiently large compared with the
second-efficient supplier, then the most-efficient supplier can exercise monopoly power over
buyer j and set the classic monopoly price pMαj(g)j. Otherwise, the presence of at least one
competing supplier limits the most-efficient supplier’s price to cβj(g)j. In the last case, buyer
j’s consumer surplus is equal to wg(βj (g) j), and the profit for buyer j’s most-efficient sup-
plier on their link is given by (cβj(g)j − cαj(g)j)qˆαj(g)j. Of course, the Bertrand equilibrium is
inefficient.
We now address competition in both prices and fees. Recall our reinterpretation of fees
as the price for a contract that allows buyer j ∈ B to purchase unlimited amounts of the
good from supplier i ∈ S against price pij. In the negotiation model, we let each supplier
propose such contracts to all the buyers he is connected with. So, each supplier sets possibly
relation-specific prices and fees to all such buyers. Formally, each supplier i ∈ S proposes
prices (pij)j∈B:ij∈g and fees (fij)j∈B:ij∈g, and then each buyer j ∈ B first decides how much
to trade with whom, so we interpret qij > 0 as buyer j’s acceptance of supplier i’s contract.
Also this negotiation model is a well defined game in extensive form, and by equilibrium
we mean subgame perfect equilibrium. We establish the following equilibrium paths, the
supporting strategy profile can be found in the proof.
Proposition 7 Let g ⊆ gN be a non-expandable infrastructure. For the unique equilibrium
in the negotiation model where the supply side proposes, and the demand side decides how
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much to trade with whom, it holds that suppliers propose
p∗αj(g)j = cαj(g)j, p
∗
βj(g)j
= cβj(g)j, p
∗
ij ≥ cij, if i 6= αj (g) , βj (g) ,
f ∗αj(g)j = wg(αj (g) j)− wg(βj (g) j), f ∗βj(g)j = 0, f∗ij ≥ 0, if i 6= αj (g) , βj (g) ,
and, on the equilibrium path, the buyers purchase
q∗αj(g)j = argmaxqαj(g)j≥0 uj(qαj(g)j)− cαj(g)jqαj(g)j, q∗βj(g)j = 0, q∗ij = 0, if i 6= αj (g) .
Again, the multiplicity in prices and fees is inessential. In any equilibrium, f ∗βj(N |g)j > 0
cannot hold under competition, because supplier αj (N |g) is than tempted to charge a fee
slightly above the upper bound wg (αj (N |g) j)−wg
(
βj (N |g) j
)
knowing that buyer j will not
switch. Also, p∗βj(N |g)j > cβj(N |g)j allows additional out-of-equilibrium extraction of consumer
surplus.
Proposition 7 states that oligopolistic competition in prices and fees is Pareto efficient,
because all suppliers adopt marginal-cost pricing. This result also implies that competition in
prices and fees must emerge if suppliers have the possibility to set fees. To see this, consider a
buyer with several competing suppliers that limit the most-efficient supplier’s Bertrand equi-
librium price of Proposition 6 to cβj(g)j. Recall that buyer j’s consumer surplus is wg(βj (g) j),
and most-efficient supplier αj (g)’s profit of this link is (cβj(g)j − cαj(g)j)qˆαj(g)j. The sum of
this profit plus the positive dead weight loss is equal to wg(αj (g) j)−wg(βj (g) j), which im-
plies the upper bound on the most-efficient supplier’s fee has a nice graphical interpretation.
By adopting marginal-cost pricing and setting a positive fee, the most-efficient supplier is
able to extract the Bertrand equilibrium profit and also the dead weight loss through the
fee. Hence, each most-efficient supplier will choose the latter and competition in prices and
fees must emerge endogenously. Only in case wg(αj (g) j) = wg(βj (g) j), which would imply
equal marginal costs, fees will be zero.
An important issue is whether consumers are better off under Bertrand competition or
competition in prices and fees. For an individual buyer j ∈ B, the answer depends upon
whether pˆαj(g)j = p
M
αj(g)j
or pˆαj(g)j = cβj(g)j in Proposition 6. In the first case we have
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that pˆαj(g)j < cβj(g)j, and buyer j ∈ B enjoys a higher consumer surplus under Bertrand
price competition than under competition in prices and fees. Hence, such buyer is worse
off under competition in prices and fees. In the other case, buyer j ∈ B is charged cβj(g)j
under both types of competition and enjoy a consumer surplus of wg(βj (g) j). Then, such a
buyer is indifferent between Bertrand price competition and competition in prices and fees.
The second case will hold for markets in which the differences in marginal costs between
most-efficient suppliers and second-efficient suppliers are sufficiently small. To summarize,
consumers are weakly worse off under competition in prices and fees than under Bertrand
price competition. This generalizes insights of Oi (1971).
Our results differ from the literature on two-part pricing in oligopolistic markets that
all have a complete infrastructure in our terminology. Harrison and Kline (2001) assume
homogenous agents on both sides, constant marginal costs and competition in quantities
and fees. They report marginal-cost pricing and positive homogeneous fees. We attribute
their result of positive fees to quantity competition as opposed to the zero fees under price
competition in our setting. Kanemoto (2000) studies the first-order conditions for profit
maximization of interior Nash equilibria in a general model of competition in prices and fees.
Translated to our model, he reports marginal-cost pricing and fees that are related to the
buyers’ Hicksian expenditure functions. Because the maximal stable fees of Proposition 7
are boundary solutions, his analysis of interior Nash equilibria does not apply. Calem and
Spulber (1984) assume two groups of buyers and two suppliers of close, but not necessarily
perfect, substitutes, say pasta and rice. They implicitly impose that consumers from both
buyer groups pay the same price and fee, i.e., uniform prices and fees. Under all these
assumptions, uniform prices exceed marginal costs and the maximal uniform fees are set by
the threat of exclusive trade with the other supplier.
In some markets, it is the demand side that has most or all market power. For example,
in the airline industry buyers such as Boeing and Airbus appear to be more powerful than
their suppliers of particular parts of the aircraft. Obviously, such markets can be captured
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by reversing the roles of the agents in the previous negotiation model. In this modified
model, we let each buyer propose one contract specifying a price and fee to the suppliers of
choice he is connected with. Then, the suppliers who received a contract decide whether to
accept. Then, buyers decide how much to trade with whom. Formally, each buyer j ∈ B
proposes prices (pij)j∈B:ij∈g and fees (fij)j∈B:ij∈g, then each supplier i ∈ S accepts or rejects,
and finally buyers purchase goods. This negotiation model is again a well defined game in
extensive form, and by equilibrium we mean subgame perfect equilibrium. Without formal
proof, we state the following result.
Proposition 8 Let g ⊆ gN be a non-expandable infrastructure. For the unique equilibrium
in the negotiation model where the demand side proposes, it holds that i) buyer j ∈ B
always proposes to supplier αj (g) the contract p
∗
αj(g)j
= cαj(g)j and f
∗
αj(g)j
= 0; ii) supplier
αj (g) always accepts, and iii) buyer j ∈ B demands q∗αj(g)j = argmaxqαj(g)j≥0 uj(qαj(g)j) −
cαj(g)jqαj(g)j.
This result states that for market power on the demand side, we obtain what we have
identified earlier as the competitive equilibrium in relation-specific prices. The demand side
cannot do better in any stable market outcome.
4.4 Buyer protection
In the analysis thus far, we analyzed one particular infrastructure in isolation. In this section,
we compare different non-expandable infrastructures and we pose the question which of
these infrastructures provide maximal consumer protection, for which we provide a novel
but natural definition. Recall that non-expandable infrastructures have sunk building costs,
and we therefore compare different infrastructures by their effects on the set of stable market
outcomes on wg.
The complete infrastructure g = gN is a special case in which each supplier is con-
nected to each buyer. It represents the standard notion of competition in a market in which
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everyone can trade with everyone else. Under sunk building costs, the complete infrastruc-
ture enables the highest joint welfare from trade, which is maxg⊆gN
∑
j∈B wg(αj (g) j) =
maxg⊆gN
∑
j∈B maxi∈S wg (ij). So, the entire market achieves a level of maximal joint welfare
of
∑
j∈B wg(αj (gN) j). Note that the minimal non-expandable infrastructure that achieves
the same level of welfare only consists of the links between each buyer and his most-efficient
supplier. We define the latter infrastructure as the non-expandable infrastructure gE ⊆ gN
given by:
gE = { αj (gN) j | j ∈ B,αj (gN) ∈ S } . (8)
The issue is that on the non-expandable infrastructure gE, buyers are unprotected against
market power, because it lacks any of the links between each buyer and his second-efficient
supplier. The important question to be answered is what non-expandable infrastructure
serves buyers best in protecting their interests? As a criterion, we propose to maximize the
worst-case for the buyers’s consumer surpluses over all non-expandable infrastructures, which
would be their consumer surplus with the second-efficient supplier on such infrastructure.
Formally, in non-expandable infrastructure g ⊆ gN the buyers can guarantee themselves∑
j∈B wg(βj (g) j). It is this criterion that should be maximized to optimally protect buyers.
Obviously, the complete infrastructure guarantees the highest consumer surplus from trade,
because maxg⊆gN
∑
j∈B wg(βj (g) j) =
∑
j∈B maxi∈S wg
(
βj (gN) j
)
. Note that the minimal
non-expandable infrastructure g ⊆ gN that achieves maximal protection links buyer j to his
most-efficient supplier αj (gN) ∈ S and his second-efficient supplier βj (gN) ∈ B. Without
the link between αj (gN) and j, both buyer j’s most-efficient supplier and his second-efficient
supplier would change, destroying some joint welfare and some guaranteed consumer surplus.
We define the minimal non-expandable infrastructure gM ⊆ gN that achieves maximal buyer
protection under sunk building costs as:
gM =
{
αj (gN) j , βj (gN) j
∣∣ j ∈ B, αj (gN) , βj (gN) ∈ S} . (9)
The set of stable market outcomes under non-expandable infrastructure gM , or any non-
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expandable infrastructure g ⊆ gN containing gM , is equal to the set of stable outcomes under
the complete infrastructure gN . This minimal infrastructure is rather sparse. Without any
of the links βj (gN) j, the set of stable market outcomes would enlarge for all non-expandable
infrastructures g ⊆ gN containing gE. Formally, every infrastructure g ⊆ gN such that g ⊇ gE
and g + gM has a larger set of stable market outcomes than the complete infrastructure gN .
The reason is that some of the upper bounds on the most-efficient suppliers’ fees increase.
Removing any of the links αj (gN) j has two negative effect: both the maximal joint welfare
on the infrastructure and the maximal attainable consumer surplus drop. To summarize this
discussion, we have established:
Proposition 9 Non-expandable infrastructure gM is the minimal non-expandable infrastruc-
ture g ⊆ gN that achieves maximal consumer protection. Moreover, all non-expandable
infrastructures g ⊆ gN that contain gM also achieve this, which includes the complete in-
frastructure gN .
This result also implies that the set of stable market outcomes for all non-expandable
infrastructures g ⊆ gN that contain gM is the smallest set of stable market outcomes over
all infrastructures that contain gE, which includes the complete infrastructure gN . For all
infrastructures that contain gE but only partly overlap with gM , the set of stable market
outcomes is larger.
4.5 Examples
In this subsection, we discuss two important examples. The first extends the motivating
example of Section 3 by having a second buyer. In this example, both buyers have the same
most-efficient supplier. In the second example, we consider two geographically differentiated
markets, each with a domestic supplier, so that each buyer has a different most-efficient
supplier. This model is also a modified version of the spatial competition model in Hotelling
(1929). Both interpretations of the model are itself influential models, and our results both
of them to competition in prices and fees.
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Case V I
Figure 2: The single supplier infrastructure in Case III is gE, Case IV and V represent
duopoly markets, and the complete infrastructure of Case V I coincides with gM .
Example 10 Consider a market with two suppliers, supplier 1 being efficient and supplier 2
inefficient, and two buyers, buyer 1 having a higher marginal willingness to pay than buyer 2.
Supplier 1’s constant joint marginal costs of production and transportation are c11 = c12 = 1,
and those for supplier 2 are c21 = c22 = 2. Buyer 1 has the quasi-linear utility function
10
√
q11 + q21−p11q11−f11−p21q21−f21, and buyer 2 has 8√q12 + q22−p12q12−f12−p22q22−f22.
Then, wg (11) = 25, wg (21) = 12.5, wg (12) = 16 and wg (22) = 8. In infrastructure III of
Figure 2, which is gE of (8), both buyers are only connected to their most-efficient suppliers
on the complete infrastructure gN , which is supplier 1. Then, 0 ≤ f11 ≤ wg (11) = 25 and
0 ≤ f12 ≤ wg (12) = 16, and the maximal fees correspond to monopoly market power. In
contrast, in infrastructure V I of Figure 2, which is gM of (9), both buyers are connected
to their most-efficient supplier, i.e. 1, and second-most-efficient supplier, i.e. 2, on the
complete infrastructure gN . Note that for this example gM = gN . Then, under V I the range
of fees is smaller 0 ≤ f11 ≤ wg (11) − wg (21) = 12.5 and 0 ≤ f12 ≤ wg (12) − wg (22) = 8,
and the maximal fees are limited due to increased competition.
For a graphical illustration of fees and consumer surpluses in relation to non-expandable
infrastructures, we can consider all possible infrastructures with two suppliers and two buyers
that contain infrastructure gE. The most relevant infrastructures are given in Figure 2, the
infrastructures gE (Case III) and gM (Case V I), and both intermediate infrastructures.
The graphical representation of the set of stable market outcomes for these non-expandable
infrastructures is given in Figure 3. The largest diamond-shaped area represents the set of
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Comp.Eq.
f12 + CS2 = 16
f21 + CS1 = 12.5
f22 + CS2 = 8
f11 + CS1 = 25
For all stable market outcomes: supplier 2’s producer surplus is 0
Figure 3: Different areas represent several sets of stable market outcomes of Example 10,
where buyer i’s consumer surplus is denoted CSi, i = 1, 2. The line f21 + CS1 = 12.5
illustrates the effect of the link 21, and f22 + CS2 = 8 the link 22.
stable market outcomes in case of the single supplier infrastructure gE. The effect of having
access to second-efficient suppliers, i.e. infrastructure gE augmented with one of the links 21
or 22 or both, are illustrated by the two lines that run through the largest diamond-shape area.
The link 21 is associated with the line whose sum is 12.5, and the link 22 with 8. In case both
these links are present, we are in infrastructure gM (Case V I) and the smallest diamond-
shaped area corresponds to the smallest set of stable market outcomes on infrastructures that
contain gE. Although the links with supplier 2 will not be utilized, their presence reduces the
maximal fee f11 charged to buyer 1 from 25 to 12.5 and the maximal fee f12 charged to buyer
2 from 16 to 8.
Example 11 As a second example, we consider two geographically differentiated markets.
Supplier 1 and buyer 1 are situated close to each other, i.e. belong to the same geographical
market, while supplier 2 and buyer 2 are located in the second market, which is distant
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from the market 1. For each supplier, the marginal cost of production and transportation
for the home market is 1 and for the distant market equal to 2, i.e. c11 = c22 = 1 and
c21 = c12 = 2. Buyers’ utility functions are the same as in Example 10. In this setting we
have wg (11) = 25, wg (21) = 12.5, wg (12) = 8 and wg (22) = 16. In infrastructure V II
of Figure 4, which is gE, both buyers are only connected to their most-efficient suppliers
on the complete infrastructure gN , which is supplier i = j for buyer j = 1, 2. In contrast,
for infrastructure V I of Figure 4, which is gM , both buyers are connected to their most-
efficient supplier, i.e. i = j, and second-most-efficient supplier, i.e. i 6= j, on the complete
infrastructure gN . Again, gM = gN . We might reinterpret this market as a discrete version of
the spatial competition model in Hotelling (1929) with two buyers (where buyer 1 lives in the
proximity of supplier 1 and buyer 2 lives in the proximity of supplier 2) and the differences in
marginal costs, i.e., c21 − c11 and c12 − c22, represent buyers travel costs to visit the supplier
outside their proximity.
Each supplier has a home market and may compete on his competitor’s home market as
well. Now, each buyer’s most-efficient and second-efficient suppliers switch when compared
to Example 10. As a consequence, both suppliers are active only in their regional markets and
relation-specific marginal-cost pricing with fees prevails. In particular, in infrastructure V II
of Figure 4 both buyers are connected only to their most-efficient suppliers, which are the
suppliers on the home market. In that case, maximal fees are the highest on all infrastructures
containing gE and the ranges of fees are given by 0 ≤ f11 ≤ wg (11) = 25 and 0 ≤ f22 ≤
wg (22) = 16. On the contrary, in infrastructure V , where both buyers are connected to
their most-efficient and second-efficient supplier, maximal fees are limited to 0 ≤ f11 ≤
wg (11) − wg (21) = 12.5 and 0 ≤ f22 ≤ wg (22) − wg (12) = 8. Again, buyer j’s best
protection against excessive fees set by his home (most-efficient) supplier i = j is to have
also access to his second-efficient supplier i 6= i, who is situated in a different geographical
market. The conclusion of our model is similar to Hotelling (1929), where an increase
in travel costs allows local suppliers to charge higher prices and, hence, extract a higher
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Figure 4: For two geographically differentiated markets, the single supplier infrastructure in
Case V II is gE, and the complete infrastructure of Case V I coincides with gM .
fraction of consumer surplus from local buyers. A similar conclusion holds in our modified
price-fee-setting game: a larger difference in marginal costs would imply lower maximal joint
welfare wg (12) and wg (21) and, hence, a smaller reduction in fees. Finally, not all the links
of infrastructure V I are utilized for trade, i.e. links 12 and 21 are not utilized, but their
presence prevents suppliers from abuse of market power through setting excessive fees.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this study, we consider price-fee competition in bilateral oligopolies with perfectly-divisible
goods, concentrated heterogeneous agents on both sides, non-expandable infrastructures,
and constant marginal costs. For such markets, we define and characterize stable mar-
ket outcomes that reflect that both sides possess market power. For every non-expandable
infrastructure, stable market outcomes are both bilaterally and Pareto efficient because sup-
pliers set unit prices equal to the relation-specific marginal costs. The relation-specific fees
split the bilateral joint welfare and the fee implicitly reflects the suppliers’ market power. In
particular, each buyer exclusively trades with his most-efficient supplier on the infrastruc-
ture and the maximal relation-specific fee is limited by the buyer’s threat to switch to his
second-efficient supplier on the infrastructure. Marginal-cost pricing and maximal fees also
arise from a negotiation model that extends differentiated Bertrand price competition. Com-
petition in both prices and fees necessarily emerges. Although it improves welfare compared
to price competition, the buyers’s will be either equally off or worse off.
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Our results quantify the countervailing power hypothesis that is first articulated in Gal-
braith (1952): Buyers have countervailing power that can restrain the market power of
suppliers. In our study, buyers have a stronger bargaining position if the threat to switch
orders from one supplier to another yields a larger maximal-attainable consumer surplus.
We quantify this insight for any non-expandable infrastructure and, generally speaking, the
supply side’s market power is decreasing in the number of arbitrary links a buyer has. This
implies the testable implication that relation-specific fees decrease in the number of such
links. We also characterize the minimal infrastructure that protects buyers the most and
identify for each buyer two links that are crucial in protecting him from the supply side’s
market power. Then, the other links become superfluous.
Future research should relax several assumptions made in this study. First of all, every
supplier can produce any quantity demanded by the buyers that are linked to him and each
link can accommodate such demand. Our setup is flexible enough to include supplier-specific
caps on production and limited capacity of links by expanding Definition (1) to groups of
buyers and suppliers. Moreover, the stability concept employed can be maintained. Relaxing
the assumption of constant marginal costs can be handled the same way. All these model
changes will enrich the insights derived from them.
The following issue is also left for future research. The minimal non-expandable in-
frastructure that limits the most the supply side’s market power includes the minimal non-
expandable infrastructure that maximizes social welfare. Also, the former infrastructure has
twice the number of links as the latter one and the link with the second-efficient supplier
will never be utilized in any stable outcome. For non-expandable infrastructures this is no
issue, the infrastructure is fixed. But for expandable infrastructures with costly building of
new links, this poses the intriguing question, when (not) to build costly links that will never
be utilized but are needed to reduce maximal fees? We address this issue in the companion
paper Funaki et al. (2012).
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6 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 4.
For any coalition C, cancelling common terms in (2)-(4) implies
∑
j∈CB

uj (q∗j (N |g))− ∑
i∈Tj(Q|g)
cijq
∗
ij

 ≥ max
Q|g
∑
j∈CB

uj (qj (C|g))− ∑
i∈Tj(Q|g)∩C
cijqij

 , (10)
i.e. for coalition C the sum of joint welfare in the stable market outcome is at least the
maximal sum of joint welfare in the coalition C. Since all cij are mutually different, the
maximum is achieved only if each buyer j ∈ CB exclusively deals with his most-efficient
supplier i ∈ CS on g, which we denote αj (C|g) in this proof including C = N for which we
already defined αj (g). Combined with (1) for ij ∈ g, the right-hand side of (10) is equal to
max
Q|g
∑
j∈CB
[
uj(qαj(C|g)j)− cαj(C|g)jqαj(C|g)j
]
=
∑
j∈CB
wg (αj (C|g) j) .
So, for each coalition C ⊆ N , (10) is equivalent to
∑
j∈CB

uj (q∗j (N |g))− ∑
i∈Tj(Q|g)
cijq
∗
ij

 ≥ ∑
j∈CB
wg (αj (C|g) j) ,
and for C = N , (10) is equivalent to
∑
j∈B

uj (q∗j (N |g))− ∑
i∈Tj(Q|g)
cijq
∗
ij

 =∑
j∈B
wg (αj (N |g) j) .
The previous arguments also imply that the latter equality holds at C = N if and only if
∑
j∈B

uj (q∗j (N |g))− ∑
i∈Tj(Q|g)
cijq
∗
ij

 = max
Q|g
∑
j∈B

uj (qj (N |g))− ∑
i∈Tj(Q|g)
cijqij

 .
Hence, for every buyer j ∈ B it must hold that q∗αj(N |g)j maximizes uj(qαj(g)j)− cαj(g)jqαj(g)j,
and q∗ij = 0 for all i ∈ S\ {αj (N |g)}. By assumption 1, q∗αj(N |g)j > 0. Then also, q∗j (N |g) =
q∗αj(N |g)j, buyer i’s set of active suppliers is Tj (Q|g) = {αj (N |g)}, and uj
(
q∗j (N |g)
) −∑
i∈Tj(Q|g)
cijq
∗
ij = wg (αj (N |g) j). This establishes Q∗|g.
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Next, since trade takes place against prices P ∗|g, Q∗|g can be attained through such trade
if and only if p∗αj(N |g)j = cαj(N |g)j and p
∗
ij ≥ cij for all i ∈ S\ {αj (N |g)}. The last condition
in Definition 3 sets p∗ij = cij for every link with q
∗
ij = 0, and this is the case for every
i 6= αj (N |g). Since all cij are mutually different, p∗ij > cαj(N |g)j for all i ∈ S\ {αj (N |g)}.
Finally, we derive F ∗|g. Given Q∗|g, consider supplier i and his active customer network
Ti (Q
∗|g), that is {i} ∪ Ti (Q∗|g). Suppose for ˆ ∈ Ti (Q∗|g), that supplier i and part of
his trade network want to break away by excluding trade with buyer ˆ, that is consider
coalition C = {i} ∪ Ti (Q∗|g) \ {ˆ}. Given P ∗|g, supplier i’s producer surplus is equal to
f ∗iˆ +
∑
j∈Ti(Q∗|g)\{ˆ}
f ∗ij. This implies that (2) is equivalent to
f ∗iˆ +
∑
j∈Ti(Q∗|g)\{ˆ}
[
uj
(
q∗ij
)− cijq∗ij] = f ∗iˆ + ∑
j∈Ti(Q∗|g)\{ˆ}
wg (ij) .
Hence, (4) imposes
f ∗iˆ +
∑
j∈Ti(Q∗|g)\{ˆ}
wg (ij) ≥
∑
j∈Ti(Q∗|g)\{ˆ}
wg (ij) ⇐⇒ f ∗iˆ ≥ 0.
Given Q∗|g, consider buyer ˆ ∈ B, his second-efficient supplier β ˆ (N |g), and this supplier’s
active customer network Tβˆ(N |g) (Q
∗|g), that is C = {ˆ, β ˆ (N |g)} ∪ Tβˆ(N |g) (Q∗|g). Then,
(4) imposes
uˆ(q
∗
αˆ(N |g)ˆ
)− cαˆ(N |g)ˆq∗iˆ − f ∗αˆ(N |g)ˆ +
∑
j∈Tβˆ(N|g)(Q
∗|g)
wg (ij)
≥ wg
(
β ˆ (N |g) ˆ
)
+
∑
j∈Tβˆ(N|g)(Q
∗|g)
wg (ij) ,
Since uˆ(q
∗
αˆ(N |g)ˆ
)− cαˆ(N |g)ˆq∗iˆ = wg (αˆ (N |g) ˆ), this condition is equivalent to
f ∗αˆ(N |g)ˆ ≤ wg (αˆ (N |g) ˆ)− wg
(
β ˆ (N |g) ˆ
) ≤ wg (αˆ (N |g) ˆ) .
The prices p∗ij ≥ cij and the fees f ∗ij ≥ 0 for every link with q∗ij = 0 are unrestricted, and this
is the case for every i 6= αj (N |g). 
Proof of Proposition 6.
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Given the history of proposed prices P |g, we define for each connected buyer j ∈ B the
lowest proposed price as p¯ıˆj (P |g) = mini∈S:ij∈g {pij}, where ıˆ denotes an arbitrary supplier
who set such lowest price (which might be αj (g)). Given history P |g, buyer j ∈ B purchases
qαj(g)j (P |g) =
{
argmaxqαj(g)j≥0 uj(qαj(g)j)− pαj(g)jqαj(g)j, if pαj(g)j ≤ p¯ıˆj (P |g) ,
0, otherwise,
qıˆj (P |g) =
{
argmaxqıˆj≥0 uj(qıˆj)− pıˆjqıˆj, if pαj(g)j > p¯ıˆj (P |g) ,
0, otherwise,
qij (P |g) = 0, i 6= αj (g) , ıˆ.
On the equilibrium path, ıˆ = αj (g) or βj (g), buyer j purchases qαj(g)j(Pˆ |g) = qˆαj(g)j > 0
and qβj(g)j (P |g) = 0, which is in accordance to the endogenous tie-breaking rule in Simon
and Zame (1990). Verification that the suppliers’ strategies and the buyers’ strategies form a
subgame perfect equilibrium strategy profile goes as follows: On and off the equilibrium path,
buyer j always purchases the optimal quantity from a supplier that offers the lowest price, so
his strategy is optimal for every history. If pˆαj(g)j = p
M
αj(g)j
, then supplier αj (g)’s producer
surplus is maximal and this supplier does not want to deviate. If pˆαj(g)j = cβj(g)j, then
the deviation pαj(g)j > cβj(g)j implies that buyer j will exclusively trade with βj (g) against
the price pˆβj(g)j = cβj(g)j, and supplier αj (g) looses buyer j as his customer which reduces
his positive equilibrium profits on the link αj (g) j to zero. Also, the lower deviating price
pαj(g)j < pˆαj(g)j reduces supplier αj (g)’s profits. Hence, pˆαj(g)j is optimal given the other
strategies. Since the other suppliers do not trade whether or not they deviate by setting
other prices, they do not have any profitable deviating price. This establishes equilibrium.
There do not exist other Bertrand equilibrium outcomes. To see this, in any Bertrand
equilibrium buyers always purchase from suppliers who set the lowest price. For |Sj (g)| = 1,
αj (g) = 1 and standard monopoly pricing implies pˆ1j = p
M
1j is the unique price. Next,
consider |Sj (g)| = 2. Renumber the suppliers in S such that Sj (g) = {1, 2}, αj (g) = 1
and βj (g) = 2. If p
M
1j < c2j, it is optimal for supplier 1 to act as a standard monopolist,
and supplier 2 would make negative profits by undercutting this price. Then, only pˆ1j = p
M
1j
and any pˆ2j ≥ c2j can be equilibrium prices. Next, pM1j ≥ c2j. Then, modification of the
34
arguments for the first-price auction with mutually different valuations in Simon and Zame
(1990), establishes that in any Bertrand equilibrium we must have pˆ1j = pˆ2j = c2j and buyer j
exclusively trades with supplier 1, i.e. q1j(Pˆ |g) = qˆ1j and q2j(Pˆ |g) = 0. Finally, for |Sj (g)| ≥
3, it is straightforward to show that both pˆαj(g)j = pˆβj(g)j ≤ mini∈S\{αj(g),βj(g)}:ij∈g cij, and
then the arguments for |Sj (g)| = 2 apply to suppliers αj (g) and βj (g). The other pij ≥ cij
are unrestricted. 
Proof of Proposition 7.
Given the history h of proposed prices P |g and fees F |g, for each connected buyer j ∈ B
define the proposed price and fee combination from which this buyer can achieve the largest
consumer surplus as p¯ıˆj (P |g) and f¯ıˆj (P |g), where ıˆ denotes an arbitrary supplier who set such
combination (which might be αj (g)). Given history h, buyer j ∈ B exclusively purchases
from supplier αj (g) the quantity qαj(g)j (h) = argmaxqαj(g)j≥0 uj(qαj(g)j)−pαj(g)jqαj(g)j−fαj(g)j
if
max
qαj(g)j
≥0
uj(qαj(g)j)− pαj(g)jqαj(g)j − fαj(g)j ≥ max
i∈S:ij∈g
max
qij≥0
[uj(qij)− pijqij − fij] ,
and qαj(g)j (P |g) = 0 otherwise. Buyer j exclusively purchases from supplier ıˆ the quantity
qıˆj (h) = argmaxqıˆj≥0 uj(qıˆj)− pıˆjqıˆj if
max
qαj(g)j
≥0
uj(qαj(g)j)− pαj(g)jqαj(g)j − fαj(g)j < max
i∈S:ij∈g
max
qij≥0
[uj(qij)− pijqij − fij] ,
and qıˆj (P |g) = 0 otherwise. Buyer j always purchase qij (P |g) = 0 from the other suppliers.
On the equilibrium path, buyer j purchases q∗αj(g)j ≡ qαj(g)j(h∗), where history h∗ denotes
the proposed P ∗|g and F ∗|g. This is in accordance to the endogenous tie-breaking rule in
Simon and Zame (1990). Verification that the suppliers’ strategies and the buyers’ strategies
form a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy profile is as follows: For any history h on and
off the equilibrium path, buyer j always purchases the optimal quantity from one of the
suppliers from which he achieves the maximal consumer surplus dependent upon the history
h, so his strategy is optimal. Since p∗αj(g)j = cαj(g)j and f
∗
αj(g)j
= wg(αj (g) j)− wg(βj (g) j),
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then any deviation pαj(g)j ≥ cαj(g)j and fαj(g)j ≥ f ∗αj(g)j with at least one strict inequality
implies that buyer j will exclusively trade with βj (g) against p
∗
βj(g)j
= cβj(g)j and f
∗
βj(g)j
= 0,
and supplier αj (g) looses buyer j as his customer which reduces his equilibrium profit on the
link αj (g) j from f
∗
αj(g)j
> 0 to zero. Also, the lower deviating fee fαj(g)j < f
∗
αj(g)j
reduces
supplier αj (g)’s profits. Hence, p
∗
αj(g)j
and f ∗αj(g)j are optimal given the other strategies.
Since the other suppliers do not trade independent of the prices and fees they set, there does
not exist any profitable deviating price and fee combination for any of them. This establishes
equilibrium.
There do not exist other equilibrium outcomes. To see this, in any equilibrium buyers
always purchase from suppliers who set a price and fee combination from which buyers can
achieve a maximal consumer surplus. For |Sj (g)| = 1, we renumber such that Sj (g) = {1}.
Since βj (g) = 0 and wg (0j) = 0, we have that p
∗
1j = c1j and f
∗
1j = wg (1j) are optimal by
the results in Oi (1971). Next, consider |Sj (g)| = 2. Renumber the suppliers in S such that
Sj (g) = {1, 2}, αj (g) = 1 and βj (g) = 2. There cannot exist an equilibrium in which buyer
j exclusively trades with supplier 1 against p∗1j > c1j and
f ∗1j = max
q1j≥0
[
uj(q1j)− p∗1jq1j
]− wg (2j) < wg (1j)− wg (2j) ,
because then supplier 1 can increase his profits arbitrarily close to wg (1j)−wg (2j) by setting
the deviating price p1j = c1j and f1j = wg (1j) − wg (2j) − ε, for sufficiently small ε > 0.
So, in any equilibrium, supplier 1 can secure wg (1j) − wg (2j). Also, an equilibrium with
p∗1j > c1j and f
∗
1j > maxq1j≥0
[
uj(q1j)− p∗1jq1j
] − wg (2j) is impossible. So, p∗1j = c1j in any
equilibrium. Next, there cannot exist an equilibrium with p∗2j > c2j and f
∗
2j = 0 either. To
see this, first note that then buyer j would exclusively trade with supplier 1 against p∗1j = c1j
and
f ∗1j = wg (1j)−max
q2j≥0
[
uj(q2j)− p∗2jq2j
]
> wg (1j)− wg (2j) .
Exclusive trade is dictated by the insights in Simon and Zame (1990). Supplier 2 will
have a profit of zero, and could obtain a positive profit by setting p2j = c2j and f2j =
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1
2
(
f ∗1j − [wg (1j)− wg (2j)]
)
> 0, a contradiction. Finally, there cannot exist an equilibrium
with p∗2j = c2j and f
∗
2j > 0, because then buyer j would exclusively trade with supplier 1
at the fee f ∗1j = wg (1j) − wg (2j) + f ∗2j (exclusive trade again by Simon and Zame (1990)).
Supplier 2 will have a profit of zero, and could obtain a positive profit by decreasing his fee
to fβj(g)j =
1
2
f ∗βj(g)j > 0. So, in any equilibrium p
∗
2j = c2j and f
∗
2j = 0. Since also p
∗
1j = c1j is
necessary, and supplier 1 can secure a profit of wg (1j)−wg (2j), the unique equilibrium fee
must be f ∗1j = wg (1j)−wg (2j). By Simon and Zame (1990), this can only be supported by
exclusive trade between buyer j and supplier 1. Finally, for |Sj (g)| ≥ 3, only suppliers αj (g)
and βj (g) matter in the argument, the other suppliers’ pij ≥ cij and fij ≥ 0 are unrestricted.

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